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The aim of this investigation was to determine how cognitive performance was associated with positive and negative aﬀect and
life satisfaction over time. This study involved a secondary longitudinal analysis of cross-section data collected at Phase I (1988–
1992) and during an 18-month longitudinal followup at Phase II (1992–1998) of the Georgia Centenarian Study. Participants
included N = 137 centenarians at Time 1 and N = 68 survivors at Time 2. Signiﬁcant stability in cognitive impairment existed
at Time 1 and Time 2 for positive (β = .55,P<. 01) and negative aﬀect (β = .54,P<. 01) models. Negative aﬀect at Time 1 was
associated with lower life satisfaction at Time 1 (β =− .42,P<. 01 ). In addition, cognitive impairment at Time 2 was associated
with decreased positive emotionality at Time 2 (β =− .39, P>. 01). Furthermore, greater positive aﬀect at Time 2 was associated
with greater satisfaction with life at Time 2 (β = .35,P<. 01). It appears that positive emotionality contemporaneously inﬂuences
the association between cognitive impairment and life satisfaction among centenarians. Implications relative to improving life
satisfaction among centenarians are discussed.
1.Introduction
Late adulthood represents a developmental period of con-
tentment in life. Persons surviving to advanced old age
are reported to be happier and more satisﬁed with life
than any other age group [1]. This may be due to the
fact that old-old adults are eﬀective at diminishing negative
aﬀective conditions but optimizing emotionally meaningful
life situations [2]. Long-lived persons who have achieved
a greater sense of happiness and satisfaction in living have
done so precisely for the reason that they have developed the
necessary emotional resources to counteract most negative
age-associated stressors that may occur near the end of life
[3].Forexample,old-oldadultswhohavemaintainedasense
of security in life possessed emotionally gratifying social
relations and preserved a favorable view of health positively
appraise life [2, 3]. Yet cognitive functioning remains
an essential determinant of subjective well-being among
persons living 100 years and longer [4–7]. Investigators
have acknowledged that normative age-graded cognitive
decline suppresses key markers of biopsychosocial well-
being including individual autonomy, social involvement,
and functional capacity among very old adults [8–11]. This
suggests that poor cognitive performance may alter how
exceptionally long-lived persons appraise life. However, the
extent to which cognitive functioning and emotional aﬀect
work in tandem and are associated with life satisfaction
among centenarians is not clearly understood. A better
understanding of the association between cognition and life
satisfaction has implications relative to improving perceived
quality of life in extreme longevity.
1.1. Theoretical Considerations. According to Butler [12],
reaching advanced old age can create a heightened awareness
of impending mortality. Butler [12] theorized that this2 Journal of Aging Research
inﬂuences a “naturally occurring and universal process
characterized by the progressive return to consciousness
of past experience... to maintain one’s sense of personal
invulnerability” (p. 66). In other words, life review is an
individual act and solitary process. Butler [12] hypothesized
thatold-oldadultshaveagreateramountofunoccupiedtime
to disengage from normative social involvement in order to
gauge their well-being. In eﬀect, contemplation was believed
to bring about a sense of failure or fulﬁllment in life.
However, a disengagement perspective assumes a reduc-
tion in ego energy which contributes to subjective well-
being in old age. This assumption fails to address the devel-
opmental context in which older adults pursue happiness.
Erikson[13,14]recognizedlateadulthoodastheeighthstage
of development. During this developmental period, older
adults seek some fundamental degree of acceptance for the
life, regardless of how fulﬁlling or challenging it may have
been [12]. Erikson [13, 14] argued that sociodevelopmental
experiences in later life (e.g., retirement, death of a spouse,
family members or close friends, failing health) contribute to
a sense of mortality which can precipitate the manifestation
of acceptance. In turn, a key developmental task in late
adulthood involves active resolution of the life career [14].
Erikson [14] posited that congruence between past failings
and accomplishments relative to present life circumstances
or conditions of well-being elicits a sense of egointegrity or
life satisfaction in later life [14]. Thus, happiness is derived
through the positive resolution of the past.
Progression of modern theoretical thinking on subjective
well-being over the last three decades has focused on
resolving how hedonic qualities contribute to happiness and
satisfactionwithlife[15].Hedonicwell-beingisconceptually
deﬁned as characteristics that make life satisfying and
pleasurable versus dissatisfying and unpleasant [15, 16]. Life
satisfaction, the presence of positive aﬀect, and the absence
of negative aﬀect are traditionally identiﬁed as the core
components of hedonism [15, 17] In particular, Diener et
al. [18] theorized that positive aﬀect and negative aﬀect
inﬂuence diﬀerential outcomes in life satisfaction relative
to individual adaptation to everyday stressors. Based on
this theoretical premise, a key assumption is that aﬀective
emotions represent adaptive resources that neutralize emo-
tionality and establish a “set-point” of life satisfaction [19].
Recent theoretical and empirical interpretation on sub-
jective well-being has led some investigators to conclude that
life satisfaction is derived from cognitive-aﬀective processes
that work in tandem to make life pleasurable. According
to Socioemotional Selectivity Theory [20, SST], individuals
are guided by social (e.g., the feeling of being needed and
wanted by others) and emotional (e.g., the need to expand
ones horizons or seek meaningful life experiences) goals. As
persons reach very late life, they are believed to perceive the
remaining years of life as limited.
This motivates them to engage more frequently in
reprioritizing present-oriented life goals. In turn, greater
activation and use of cognitive resources occur over a shorter
period of time. It is assumed that many old-old adults are
disadvantaged by a reduced cognitive reserve necessary for
managing everyday challenges that require greater personal
attention or decision-making skills (e.g., management cog-
nitive impairment). SST assumes that emotional behavior
regulation assumes primacy in the lives of very old adults.
Therefore, SST posits that long-lived persons seek to avoid
negative emotions and maximize positive aﬀect to alleviate
aversive physical or mental health-related symptoms that
may compromise satisfaction with life [21, 22]. Such behav-
iors are believed to free remaining cognitive resources that
could potentially be used for more emotionally meaningful
and satisfying life activities (e.g., interactions with loved
ones). Thus, persons derive satisfaction from life not simply
because they may encounter age-associated impairment and
seek to age disability or disease-free [3, 23]. Rather, they
eﬀectively manage limited psychosocial resources for the
purpose of regulating negative emotions in order to enhance
feelings of happiness and sense of meaning near the end of
life [3, 7].
1.2. HappinessandLife Satisfaction. Emotionally meaningful
life experiences have a lasting inﬂuence on subjective well-
being [19]. Past suﬀering and lifetime achievement con-
tribute to current life satisfaction among old-old survivors
[24, 25]. Although many old-old adults view their past as
the least satisfying period of life, “right now” is perceived
with greater feelings of emotional contentment [25]. This
may reﬂect a cosmic dimension of gerotranscendence in
which exceptionally old adults live and rejoice in the mo-
ment without dwelling upon past failures [26]. Thus, it
is reasonable to assume that old-old adults may be more
inclined to savor and recount meaningful life experiences to
optimize feelings of happiness.
Life satisfaction has commonly been recognized as an
aﬀective-cognitive construct [3, 4, 11, 17, 18]. The develop-
mental past has been reported as a critical “anchor period”
and key mediating indicator of positive emotionality [24,
27]. Cognitive appraisal of the past is an adaptive strategy
by which old-old adults diminish feelings of unhappiness
[27]. Investigators have acknowledged that old-old adults
adapt to challenges and threats to personal well-being
by maintaining optimistic and meaningful perceptions of
ongoing life experiences [24, 27]. In eﬀect, such perspectives
have been reported to be emotionally beneﬁcial relative to
emotional happiness in life [27]. Therefore, it can be argued
that feelings of discontentment compromise subjective well-
being, whereas feelings of emotional contentment may
bolster satisfaction with life.
1.3. Cognitive Functioning. It is important to note that old-
er adults have a reported preference for recalling positive
autobiographical information [28, 29]. Demtsen and Rubin
[29] reported that aging adults are twice as likely to report
feeling happy than they are to admit to feeling unhappy
about life. The tendency to remember the good over the
bad is associated with cognitive performance [30, 31]. Better
cognitive functioning in advanced old age is associated with
greater emotional feelings of meaning and happiness which
in turn improves ratings of life satisfaction [3, 11, 29]. In
other words, emotional aﬀect can be considered an adaptiveJournal of Aging Research 3
resource that regulates the association between cognition
and satisfaction in life [28]. Perhaps, cognition is a key
determinant of life satisfaction in exceptionally old age
relative to the presence of aﬀective emotions.
Centenarians typically demonstrate great dispersion and
variation relative to cognitive performance [3]. Investigators
have previously estimated that approximately 20–25% of
centenarians can generally be considered as cognitively
intact [32, 33]. Another 42–100% are reported to have a
considerable degree of dementia [33]. With advancing old
age, human beings are more vulnerable to terminal decline
or “sudden drop in performance” relative to cognition [34,
page 306]. The terminal decline hypothesis speciﬁes that
intraindividualchangeincognitiveperformancemovesfrom
a preterminal phase of gradual or normative age-associated
to a more pronounced and accelerated age-graded decline
[34]. Terminal decline in cognitive functioning has been
cited as most prevalent among persons who have lived
beyond the limits of normal life expectancy [35]. Survival
into exceptional old age restricts time left to live. Proximity
to death is associated with notable losses in intellectual
and cognitive functioning as well as notable changes in
subjective well-being believed to remain stable into very
old age [36–40]. Variation in associated facets of subjective
well-being persists not only over long periods of time but
can occur within much shorter time frames [41]. In eﬀect,
some investigators have called for greater examination of
how associated factors of terminal decline (e.g., cognitive
impairment) contribute to perceived subjective well-being as
well as emotional-based outcomes of life satisfaction [36–
38, 40].
The purpose of this investigation was to determine
how cognitive performance is associated with positive and
negativeaﬀectandsatisfactioninlifeovertime.Inparticular,
we sought to answer a key question: how is cognitive
performance associated with aﬀect and life satisfaction in
exceptionaloldage?Weestablishedtwokeyhypotheses.First,
we hypothesized that greater cognitive impairment would
diminishfeelingsofpositiveaﬀectbutincreasenegativeaﬀect
over time. Second, we hypothesized that greater cognitive
impairment would erode how satisﬁed centenarians feel
about life over time.
2. Method
This investigation involved a secondary analysis of longi-
tudinal data originating from the Phase I and Phase II
Georgia Centenarian Study [32, GCS]. Phase I of the GCS
was conducted from 1988 to 1992 and involved a baseline
cross-sectional investigation at Time 1. Phase II of the GCS
was completed from 1992 to1998 and involved an 18 month
longitudinal followup of original and surviving Phase 1
participants. Both phases of the study were reviewed and
approved by the university Institutional Review Board (IRB).
2.1. Participants Sampling and Procedures. Participants were
required to be cognitively intact, community-dwelling, and
residing within private residences in the state of Georgia. All
participants were cognitively screened and interviewed by a
trained interviewer of GCS. Phase I participants consisted of
a convenience sample of N = 137 during initial assessment
at Time 1. Phase 2 participants included a total of N = 68
longitudinal survivors who were reassessed and interviewed
again 20 months later at Time 2.
All participants were required to be cognitively intact
in order to participate. Screening for cognitive status
was completed to address two primary considerations: (a)
protection of cognitively frail centenarians with advanced
cognitive impairment who may not be able to complete
a semistructured interview; (b) protection of centenarians
from unnecessary stress, fatigue, agitation, or confusion aris-
ing during the completion of research involving a semistruc-
tured interviewthatwouldotherwisebebeyondtheirnormal
daily routine. The Mini-Mental State Examination [42]w a s
the primary instrument used to initially screen all Phase I
participants for cognitive status. We considered cognitively
intact participants appropriate for study participation to be
those with a score of 23 or higher on the Mini-Mental
State Examination, as mentioned by Folstein et al. [42].
The Global Deterioration scale [43] served as a secondary
cognitive screening instrument. The GDS was used in
the event centenarian participants presented with sensory
impairments (e.g., vision, hearing) that limited accurate
assessment or the ability to fully complete the MMSE. The
GDS is a seven-item interviewer rating of subjective memory
complaint,orientation,andfunctionalability.Acut-oﬀscore
of 2 or less, as mentioned by Reisberg et al. [43], was
considered indicative of severe cognitive impairment. All
participants were reassessed using the MMSE and the GDS
during Phase II 18-month followup.
Demographic characteristics reported by sample par-
ticipants at Time 1 and longitudinal survivors at Time
2 have been summarized in Table 1. These data were
considered for purposes of clarifying whether comparative
demographicdiﬀerencesorsimilaritiesexistedbetweenTime
1 respondents and Time 2 survivors. Special attention was
giventowardreportedmaritalstatus,education,andincome.
Sample variation in these variables has been reported to
have underlying and potentially confounding inﬂuences
in the interpretation of how reported emotionality and
life satisfaction may be reported [41]. The majority of
participants reported being widowed, having achieved less
than a high school education, and earning a low yearly
income. Of the follow-up sample, approximately 85.5% were
widowed, 64.6% had attained some high school or less, and
72.1%earnedanannualincomeoflessthan$7,000.Toassess
diﬀerences between respondents in the ﬁrst and second wave
of the study, we computed cross-tabulations. The results
suggestedthatcentenarianparticipants atbothwavesdidnot
diﬀer relative to marital status χ2 (N = 134) = 3.97, P = .26,
education χ2 (N = 134) = 5.10, P = .64, or annual income χ2
(N = 105) = 5.10, P = .88. Therefore, centenarians within
this sample were homogeneous relative to marital status,
education, and income at Time 1 and Time 2.4 Journal of Aging Research
Table 1: Frequencies of demographic characteristics among centenarian respondents at Time 1 (N = 136) and Time 2 survivors (N = 68).
Variable T1 respondents T2 survivors
N % N %
Marital status
Single 9 6.7% 5 8.1%
Married 6 4.5% 3 4.8%
Widowed 116 86.6% 53 85.5%
Divorced 3 2.2% 1 1.6%
Total 134 100.0% 62 100.0%
Education
0–4 years 19 14.1% 11 16.1%
4–8 years 39 28.8% 23 33.8%
Some high school 16 11.9% 10 14.7%
High school 13 9.6% 4 5.9%
Business/trade 8 5.9% 4 5.9%
Some college 19 14.1% 7 10.3%
College 12 8.9% 5 7.4%
Graduate school 9 6.7% 4 5.9%
Total 135 100.0% 68 100.0%
Income
$1,000–1,999 2 1.9% 2 3.7%
$2,000–2,999 4 3.8% 3 5.6%
$3,000–3,999 11 10.5% 9 16.6%
$4,000–4999 20 19.0% 10 18.5%
$5,000–5,999 24 22.9% 11 20.3%
$6,000–6,999 10 9.5% 4 7.4%
$7,000–9,999 15 14.3% 7 13.0%
$10,000–14,999 6 5.7% 3 5.6%
$15,000–19,999 2 1.9% — —
$20,000–29,999 6 5.7% 3 5.6%
$40,000 and over 5 4.8% 2 3.7%
Total 105 100.0% 54 100.0%
2.2. Analytical Design. The main objective of this study
was to examine how cognitive impairment was associated
with positive and negative aﬀect and life satisfaction across
two time points. To achieve this goal, we conducted a
secondary longitudinal analysis of Phase 1 (Time 1) and
Phase 2 (Time 2) GCS data using SPSS 17.0. Path analytic
techniques were used to assess stability coeﬃcients, examine
path coeﬃcients between variables, and assess cross-lag
eﬀects among variables measured across the two time points
[44]. In addition, path analytic models were used to identify
any key mediating associations [44]. For this study, we
assessed variables reﬂecting cognitive performance, positive
and negative aﬀect, and life satisfaction.
2.3. Measures
2.3.1. Cognitive Performance. Cognitive performance was
assessed using the Short-Portable Mini-Mental Status Ques-
tionnaire [45, SPMSQ]. The SPMSQ was designed as a brief
ten-itemtestoforganicbrainfunctioning.Thequestionnaire
isusedtodetermineorientationtotime(e.g.,whatisthedate
today?)andplace(e.g.,whatisthenameofthisplace?),recall
of information (e.g., when were you born?), and numeric
ability (e.g., subtract 3 from 20 and keep subtracting back-
ward). A score of 0–2 typically represents normal cognitive
functioning, whereas a score of 3-4 errors indicates mild
cognitive, a score of 5–7 errors indicates moderate cognitive
impairment, and a score of 8 or more errors is suggestive
of severe cognitive deﬁcit. The SPMSQ is also adjusted by
education. Pfeiﬀer [45] noted that participants who have
a grade school education are allowed one or more errors.
However, one less error is allowed if the person received an
education beyond high school. For purposes of this study, we
used a summary score indicative to total number of errors
made on the SPSMQ. A high cumulative number of errors
made represented greater cognitive impairment, whereas a
low cumulative number of errors represented less cognitive
impairment. Cronbach’s alpha of this scale was .58 at Time 1
and .73 at Time 2.
2.3.2. Positive/Negative Aﬀect. The Bradburn Aﬀect Balance
Scale [46, BABS] served as the primary measure of positiveJournal of Aging Research 5
and negative aﬀect. This scale includes two sets of questions,
each consisting of ﬁve items. One set of questions is used
to measure positive aﬀect (e.g., feeling pleased about having
accomplished something; feeling on top of the world),
whereas the other set of questions is used to evaluate
negative aﬀect (e.g., feeling depressed or very unhappy;
feeling vaguely uneasy). Participants were asked to indicate
how they had recently felt on a four-point Likert scale
(1 = n o ta ta l l ;4= often). Positive and negative aﬀective
items were coded and summed into a summary of positive
and negative aﬀect. A high score on positive aﬀective items
indicated high positive emotionality, whereas a low score
represented low positive emotionality. Similarly, negative
aﬀective items were coded so that a high score reﬂected
high negative emotionality and a low score represented
low negative emotionality. Test-retest reliability indicative of
Cronbach alpha for positive aﬀect items at Time 1 and Time
2w a sα = .51 and α = .66, respectively, whereas test-retest
reliability of negative aﬀect items at Time 1 and Time 2 was
α = .68 and α = .60.
2.3.3. Life Satisfaction. The Life Satisfaction Index-A [47,
LSI-A]wasusedastheprimaryevaluationoflifesatisfaction.
The LSI-A is a 20-item scale used to assess ﬁve characteristics
of life satisfaction including zest for living (e.g., the things
I do are as interesting to me as they ever were); resolution
a n df o r t i t u d e( e . g . ,Ih a v eg o t t e nm o r eb r e a k si nl i f et h a n
most people I know); self-concept (e.g., I feel my age but
it does not bother me); congruence (e.g., as I look back on
my life, I am fairly well satisﬁed); mood tone (e.g., I am as
happy as when I was younger). Participants were asked to
indicate whether they 1 = disagree, 0 = are uncertain, or 3 =
agree with each statement. Items were summed to form a
cumulative score of life satisfaction. A high score indicated
high life satisfaction. A low score reﬂected low feelings of
happiness. Alpha reliability across subscale items was .61 at
Time 1 and .61 at Time 2.
3. Results
Means and standard deviations on all study variables were
examined to determine whether Time 1 respondent and
Time 2 survivors signiﬁcantly diﬀered relative to responses
on all key study variables. These data have been summarized
in Table 2. A signiﬁcant diﬀerence in cognitive performance
emerged among survivors, t(41) =− 4.25, P<. 01. In other
words,averagenumberoferrorsmadeontheSPMSQ[32]by
respondents at T1 (M = 2.07, SD = 1.70) was signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the number of errors surviving respondents
made at T2 (M = 3.30, SD = 2.35). In particular,
surviving respondents made a greater average number of
errors at T2. This suggests that longitudinal survivors had
diminished cognitive abilities during the 18-month follow-
up assessment. In addition, there were no signiﬁcant mean
diﬀerences in negative aﬀect, t(41) = .57, P = .57. This
suggests that the average negative aﬀect score of respondents
at T1 (M = 8.37, SD = 3.24) did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from
the mean negative aﬀect score of survivors at T2 (M = 8.87,
SD = 3.27). However, there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between respondents at Time 1 and those retested at T2 on
average scores of positive aﬀect, t(41) = 2.87, P<. 05. This
suggests that average positive aﬀect scores among survivors
at T2 were greater than at T1. In particular, average positive
aﬀect scores between respondents at T1 (M = 12.42, SD =
3.10) and T2 survivors (M = 11.26, SD = 3.60) were
diﬀerent. Finally, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence evident
in the average mean scores of respondent life satisfaction at
T1 versus T2, t(41) =− .29, P = .77.
Am o d e lo fn e ga t i v ea ﬀect was then constructed and path
relationships were assessed (Figure 1). We ﬁrst examined sta-
bility and cross-lag coeﬃcients. Signiﬁcant stability existed
between cognitive impairment at Time 1 and Time 2 (β =
.54, P<. 01). Thus, it appears that cognitive impairment
remains relative stable over time. Signiﬁcant stability did not
emerge across the negative aﬀect or life satisfaction at Time 1
and Time 2. Slight evidence of a signiﬁcant cross-lag eﬀect
did emerge between negative aﬀect at Time 1 and Time 2
(β =− .29, P = .05). This suggests that greater negative
emotions at T1 decrease life satisfaction at T2.
Similarly, we assessed path relationships within a panel-
designmodelofpositiveaﬀect(Figure 2).Signiﬁcantstability
existed between cognitive impairment at Time 1 and Time 2
(β = .55, P<. 01). Thus, it appears that cognitive impair-
ment remains relative stable over time. Signiﬁcant stability
did not emerge across positive aﬀect or life satisfaction at
Time 1 and Time 2. Furthermore, there was no evidence of
signiﬁcant cross-lag eﬀects within the positive aﬀect model.
Next, we evaluated path associations between study
variables at Time 1 in both models. A signiﬁcant positive
association emerged relative to negative aﬀect and life
satisfaction during Time 1 (β =− .42, P<. 01, Figure 1). In
particular,centenarianspossessinggreaternegativeemotions
during the initial assessment also felt less satisﬁed with life.
Seventeen percent of variance in life satisfaction at Time
1 was explained by negative aﬀect at Time 1. Relative to
positive aﬀect at Time 1, no signiﬁcant association emerged
with life satisfaction at Time 1. Evidence of a nonsigniﬁcant
association at Time 1 may represent an anomaly of the
studydesignthatwasused.Exclusionofcognitivelyimpaired
participants may have restricted the range of cognitive ability
scores among study participants at Time 1. In turn, this may
have led to lower associations between cognitive impairment
and positive or negative aﬀect. Finally, only 3% of the
variance in life satisfaction at Time 1 was explained by
positive aﬀect at Time 1.
We then examined path coeﬃcients at Time 2 for
both models. No signiﬁcant path associations were evident
between cognitive impairment at Time 2 and negative aﬀect
at Time 2, or negative aﬀect at Time 2 and life satisfaction
at Time 2. However, greater cognitive impairment at Time 2
was associated with reduced positive emotionality at Time 2
(β =− .39,P<. 01).Inotherwords,poorcognitivefunction-
ing diminishes the extent to which centenarians experience
positive emotions. Nonetheless, greater positive emotions at
Time 2 was associated with greater life satisfaction at Time 2
(β = .35, P<. 01). It is important to note that approximately
32% of the variance in cognitive impairment at Time 2 was6 Journal of Aging Research
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of T1 respondent sample (N = 136) and Time 2 survivor sample (N = 68).
Variable T1 respondents T2 survivors
M SD M SD
Cognitive impairment 2.07 1.70 3.30 2.35∗∗
Positive aﬀect 12.42 3.10 11.26 3.60∗
Negative aﬀect 8.37 3.24 8.87 3.27
Life satisfaction 12.37 3.09 12.41 3.11
Note. ∗P< . 05. ∗∗P< . 01
T1 0.11 −0.42∗∗
0.54∗∗ 0.17
0.03
−0.17 −0.04
0.03
−0.23
−0.29∗
0.19
T2
positive aﬀect
R2 = 0.15
T1
life satisfaction
R2 = 0.17
T2
life satisfaction
R2 = 0.1
T2
cognition
R2 = 0.29
T1
negative aﬀect
= 0.01 R2 cognition
Figure 1: Negative aﬀect model of life satisfaction among centenarians at Time 1 (N = 136) to Time 2 (N = 68). Note. ∗P<. 05, ∗∗P<. 01.
explained by cognition and positive aﬀect at Time 1. Only
18%ofthevarianceinpositiveaﬀectatTime2wasexplained
by cognitive impairment at Time 1 and 2 as well as positive
aﬀect at Time 1. Furthermore, 19% of the variance in life
satisfactionatTime2wasexplainedbypositiveaﬀectatTime
1 and Time 2 as well as life satisfaction at Time 1.
Finally, we consider potential mediating inﬂuences.
According to Kenny et al. [48], mediation exits when
two conditions are met: (1) the path between a predictor
and a mediating variable represents a signiﬁcant increase,
while the path from the mediating variable maintains a
signiﬁcantdecrease;(2)thepathbetweenapredictorvariable
and a proximal mediating variable represents a signiﬁcant
decrease, while the path from the mediating variable results
in a signiﬁcant increase.
Based on results from the panel model, two mediating
relationships emerged within the positive aﬀect model. First,
cognitive impairment at Time 2 represented a key mediating
inﬂuence between cognitive impairment at Time 1 and
positive aﬀect at Time 2. In eﬀect, cognitive impairment
at Time 1 continues to erode at Time 2, which in turn
diminishes the extent to which centenarians experience
positive emotions. Thus, cognition at Time 1 continued
to have a negative indirect eﬀect on positive aﬀect in the
presence of continued decline in cognitive performance at
Time 2 (.55 ×− .39 =− .21). Second, positive aﬀect at Time
2 represented a key mediating variable in the association
between cognitive impairment and life satisfaction at Time
2. In other words, cognitive impairment at Time 2 continues
to compromise current life satisfaction only to the extent
centenarians experience decreased positive aﬀect (−.39 ×
.35 =− .14). Thus, greater cognitive impairment appears to
reduce feelings of emotional happiness which in turn further
diminishes life satisfaction among centenarians.
4. Discussion
This study provided key evidence to answer the original
study question as well as support the original hypotheses. In
particular, it appears that cognitive impairment does com-
promise the extent to which centenarians feel satisﬁed with
life.Twothemesemergedbasedonthisﬁnding.First,positive
emotions among long-lived persons are associated with
continuous decline in cognitive abilities. Second, cognitive
impairment has a negative contemporaneous inﬂuence on
lifesatisfaction.However,theextentofthisassociationseems
to be dependent on whether centenarians are emotionally
happy.
I np r e v i o u sw o r k ,w eh a v er e p o r t e dt h a tc e n t e n a r i a n s
who feel emotional contentment generally feel satisﬁed with
life [5, 49]. Yet results from this current investigation suggest
that this association may depend on cognitive impairment.
In particular, it appears that cognitive impairment over time
is detrimental to positive emotionality. As lower cognitive
changes persist, current positive aﬀective emotions among
centenarians decrease.
However, the extent to which cognitive impairment is
associated with life satisfaction among centenarians may be
due to the degree they feel emotionally happy. In otherJournal of Aging Research 7
T1
0.55∗∗
0.35∗∗
−0.39∗∗
−0.12
−0.07
0.17
0.12
0.18
0.08
0.05
0.17
T2
T1
positive aﬀect
R2 = 0.00
T2
positive aﬀect
R2 = 0.18
T1
life satisfaction
R2 = 0.03
life satisfaction
R2 = 0.19
T1
cognition
R2 = 0.32
cognition
Figure 2: Positive aﬀect model of life satisfaction among centenarians at Time 1 (N = 136) to Time 2 (N = 68). Note. ∗∗P<. 01.
words, the greater positive emotions appear to diminish
the deleterious inﬂuence of cognitive impairment on life
satisfaction among persons living 100 years and beyond.
Such evidence may reﬂect the developmental patterns in
life satisfaction in exceptional old age. Erikson [50]r e f e r r e d
to extreme late life as the “ninth stage.” In particular,
Erikson [50] theorized that living beyond the normative
limits of expected human longevity and experiencing on-
going physical or mental deterioration promotes a “shift in
meta perspective, from a materialistic and rational vision to
a more cosmic and transcendent one, normally followed by
anincreaseinlifesatisfaction”[50,p.123].Investigatorshave
acknowledged the association between positive emotionality
and life satisfaction as an adaptive behavior unique to long-
lived persons [51]. As centenarians continue to live, they
encounter advanced and terminal declines in physical and
mental functioning. Such challenges may tax their ability to
use psychosocial resources for purposes of adaptation and
improved disposition toward life. From the framework of
socioemotional selectivity theory [20, 21], it is plausible to
argue that centenarians are experts relative to knowing how
to selectively dissipate negative emotions and use positive
emotional energies to optimize sense of fulﬁllment in life
despite investigators have noted that the interplay between
cognition and emotionality is vital source of coping and
resilience in old-old age [3]. Thus, the achievement of emo-
tional happiness and life satisfaction among centenarians
c a nb ea r g u e da san o r m a t i v ed e v e l o p m e n t a lo u t c o m eo f
surviving diminished cognitive abilities.
Gerotranscendence provides an additional explanation
of ﬁndings. In devising the theory of gerotranscendence,
Tornstam [26] posited that the past provides a sense of
coherence and gives meaning to the present. This may
represent a developmentally normative task of exceptional
longevity. Old-old age brings an anticipation of impending
loss in cognitive, physical, or functional capacity [35].
Nonetheless, old-old adults remain resilient by adapting
new strategies in response to age-associated decline [27].
Contemplation of the accomplishments and traumas of life
allows persons in very old age to return with an emancipated
comprehension or new appreciation toward self and others
[26]. In eﬀect, the joy of appraising and resolving one’s life
career may serve to lift exceptionally old persons out of
despair and regret and into a state of emotional contentment
[26, 52, 53]. Lucas [19] has hypothesized that adaptation
to alternating life events across the life evokes stability or
a “set-point” in levels of happiness. Old-old persons may
experience life-altering events which compromise emotional
happiness, yet a positive sense of adaptation to change allows
them to eventually gain a heightened sense of satisfaction
with life. This might help explain the continued impact of
cognitive impairment on positive emotionality among cen-
tenarians over time. Furthermore, it may provide a plausible
explanation for a contemporaneous and indirect association
between cognitive impairment and life satisfaction in the
presence of positive emotions. Further investigation of the
impairment versus emotional well-being dynamic in old-old
age is warranted.
Subjective well-being represents an aﬀective-cognitive
association [17, 41, 53]. Results from this study appear to
support this hypothesis relative to positive aﬀect. Pleasant
emotions evolve to the degree that persons possess the
cognitive resources to create current satisfying memories in
the present as well as to recall meaningful experiences of
the past [24, 41]. Some investigators have reported that life
satisfaction entails autobiographical recall of essential and
meaningful life events [54, 55]. In some cases, high degree of
reported life satisfaction in old age represents a deactivated
negative aﬀective state [56, 57]. This has been acknowledged
to further improve cognitive functioning as well as retrieval
of positive emotional experiences across the life-span [57,
58]. The occurrence of positive emotions improves adaptive
capacity and allows persons in advanced old age to regain
locus of control over unhappy situations or compromising
life experiences [59, 60]. Suh et al. [61] proposed that
most individuals rely directly on cognitive functioning and
aﬀective states to frame judgment of life satisfaction. It can
be argued that this may further provide support for the
contemporaneousassociationbetweenpositiveaﬀectandlife
satisfaction.
However, poor cognitive performance does reduce pos-
itive emotions. Rabbitt et al. [11] reported that decline8 Journal of Aging Research
in cognitive capacity contributes to heightened feelings of
emotional negativity and unhappiness. The trajectory and
rate of cognitive decline and memory deﬁcits becomes more
pronounced as persons live beyond the expected limits of
human life expectancy [6, 10, 30]. This is exacerbated by
accumulative everyday hassles (e.g., degree of autonomy in
activities of daily living) and personal irritations (e.g., health
problems, social isolation) which often require greater use
andperformanceofexecutiveabilitiesinold-oldage[10,31].
It is important to note that many centenarians possess
a limited or ﬁnite cognitive reserve to properly counteract
age-associated impairment [7, 32]. Impairment in old-old
age typically represents noticeable decline in pathological
process (e.g., organic brain functioning) which contribute to
a simultaneous and terminal drop in overall life satisfaction
[36–38, 40]. Yet as persons reach very late life, age-associated
impairment becomes secondary, and they perceive their life
script more favorably [29, 61]. Investigators have noted that
old and very old adults tend to report emotional feelings
of contentment twice as often as they endorse feelings
of emotional dissatisfaction [29]. Therefore, it is plausible
to argue that pleasant emotions remain relatively intact
despite increasing cognitive impairment. Perhaps, it is the
persistence of positive aﬀective conditions in the face of age-
associated impairment that matters most for life satisfaction
among long-lived persons.
Nonetheless, our ﬁndings do provide support of the
detrimental inﬂuence poor cognitive functioning has on
life satisfaction [11]. In particular, continued cognitive
impairment erodes the extent to which centenarians derive
favorable impressions of life. Cognitive impairment also
appears to have a more contemporaneous association with
emotional happiness. In other words, the deleterious inﬂu-
ence of cognitive impairment on positive emotions appears
to be most salient among those who continue to survive
in exceptional old age. Centenarians who have experienced
recent cognitive problems feel dissatisﬁed with life to the
extent that they feel happy. Results from this study indicate
that impaired cognitive functioning in extreme late life
negatively inﬂuences a key indicator of life satisfaction,
namely, positive aﬀect. This may call into question the
potential beneﬁts of life review or reminiscence therapies
often used to elicit feeling of emotional happiness and
life satisfaction among centenarians [62, 63]. However, this
requires further investigation beyond the scope and ﬁndings
of this study.
Findings from this study provide insight into the
subjective well-being of centenarians. Nonetheless, several
limitations should be noted. For instance, convenience
sampling was used in selecting a participant sample of
community-dwelling centenarians residing in the Southern
United States. The ﬁnal sample used for this investigation
also represented cognitively intact centenarians. As previ-
ously mentioned, researchers have reported an estimated
42–100% of centenarian study samples with moderate to
severe degree of dementia [33]. The incorporation of a
randomized and population-based sample may have resulted
in improved generalizablilty of results. However, caution
should still be used in interpreting results across other
centenarian populations which may be cognitive impaired,
originate from care facilities, or reside in other regions of the
United States or world.
Another limitation involved interval of assessment.
Although we had two time points of assessments for
longitudinal analysis, the selection of diﬀerent intervals
between measurements would have enhanced the study. In
particular, this may have led to signiﬁcant time lag eﬀects
which would have improved understanding of how long
or after what time cognitive impairment, congruence, or
happiness exhibit inﬂuences. Additional time points would
have also allowed for use of more sophisticated methods
and use of growth curve modeling. The assessment of life
satisfaction across multiple time points has been reported
to advance understanding of the developmental change and
temporal mechanisms of subjective well-being [41].
Finally, the measure of life satisfaction used in this study
could be improved in future research. We used only one
quantitative measure of life satisfaction, the LSI-A [47].
This may have resulted in considerable overlap in constructs
representingpastsatisfactionwithlifeandcurrenthappiness.
Furthermore, test-retest alpha reliabilities of the LSI-A were
low to marginal. Items from the LSI-A [47]m a yn o tp r o v i d e
an appropriate assessment of life satisfaction among persons
living exceptionally long lives. Life may be conceptualized
diﬀerently among centenarians than other age groups [62,
63]. Furthermore, life satisfaction in extreme old age may be
a more complex and dynamic phenomenon which requires
integration of advance quantitative assessments, qualitative
evaluations, or greater focus on cross-cultural comparison
for improved scientiﬁc understanding. For example, the
incorporation of a structured life review or a cross-cultural
comparison may have presented alternative ﬁndings pertain-
ing to longitudinal outcomes of emotional happiness and
life satisfaction among exceptionally old adults. Perhaps,
such knowledge would improve scientiﬁc understanding of
whether life satisfaction among centenarians is universally
constructed or culturally unique. In eﬀect, qualitative insight
could have resulted in more sophisticated interpretation of
subjective well-being.
Despite limitations, this study established key insights
into how cognitive impairment and aﬀect represent key
indicators of life satisfaction. The results also raise potential
questions pertaining how to eﬀectively enhance feelings of
happiness and life satisfaction among cognitively impaired
persons in exceptional old age. Researchers should con-
tinue to increase their understanding of the underlying
mechanisms of cognition associated with life satisfaction
in advanced old age. Particularly, investigators should seek
to further explore and model conceptual and theoretical
longitudinal models of subjective well-being to examine
cognitive change and adaptation in the development of
happiness and satisfaction with life.
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